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This paper analyzes consumption risk sharing among provinces in the People’s Republic of 
China  (PRC) during  1980–2007.  The analysis finds that 9.4%  of shocks to gross provincial 
product are smoothed by the interprovincial fiscal transfer system. This system also cushions a 
relatively large percentage  of province-specific shocks in  coastal areas. Using a variety of 
indicators, we explored nonfiscal channels of consumption risk sharing. We found that the 
migration of rural labor to urban areas and the remittance of migrant wages play an important 
role in promoting interprovincial consumption risk sharing in inland PRC provinces. In contrast, 
the extent of risk sharing through financial intermediation and capital markets is very limited. 
These factors have resulted in a low degree of risk sharing among provinces, especially during 
the last decade. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
The benefits of consumption risk sharing are widely recognized in developing and developed 
countries. According to Townsend (1994, individuals can potentially raise their income, 
consumption, and savings by sharing their idiosyncratic consumption risks. Starting with the 
work of Backus et al. (1992), the extent of consumption risk sharing among regions and 
countries has been a focus of recent research. However, evidence of full consumption risk 
sharing is either limited or nonexistent, even among developed countries, leaving substantial 
room for potential welfare gains (see, for example, Backus et al. 1992, Obstfeld 1994, Asdrubali 
et al. 1996, Lewis 1996, Crucini 1999). 
To understand the sources of this incomplete sharing of consumption risk, it is crucial to identify 
the channels through which regions and countries have achieved the current degree of risk 
sharing. Asdrubali et al. (1996) (henceforth ASY) provide a simple decomposition methodology 
to determine the channels through which risk is shared. First, by accessing capital markets, 
households can share risk through the cross-ownership of productive assets in other countries 
or  regions. Second, world and national transfer systems can serve as vehicles for  further 
income and consumption risk sharing. Third, households may adjust their asset portfolios 
through borrowing and lending. Several authors
1
Despite the many studies of risk-sharing channels, little is known about them in nonindustrial 
economies. Our paper adds to the literature by analyzing the channels of consumption risk 
sharing in the People’s Republic of China (PRC), a large developing country that is playing an 
increasingly significant role in the global economy. 
 have extended this methodology to investigate 
the scope and ability for risk sharing in various countries and regions. The empirical literature on 
risk-sharing channels provides  evidence that is largely consistent with earlier findings—that 
international risk sharing is relatively uncommon. Due to the prevalence of home asset bias, 
international risk sharing usually takes place through domestic savings. Intranational risk 
sharing, in which the role of capital markets is dominant, is much more prevalent.  
The case of the PRC is interesting for several reasons. Since the PRC exhibits almost all of the 
notable features that characterize developing countries, understanding the PRC could help us 
understand the risk-sharing channels of  developing countries in general. For example, the 
PRC’s formal financial system is characterized by repressive financial policies that are prevalent 
in many developing countries. Its  private enterprises rely heavily on informal finance—
dependence typical for developing economies. The PRC still has a dual-economy structure in 
which rural–urban migration plays an essential part in relieving rural poverty, a feature common 
to underdeveloped economies.  
Studying risk sharing in a developing country such as the PRC offers unique perspectives that 
are not available in studies of developed economies. For instance, capital and credit markets 
have long been regarded as crucial for domestic consumption risk sharing in developed 
countries.
2
                                                 
1 For instance, Asdrubali (1998) distinguishes risk sharing from intertemporal smoothing, Dedola et al. (1999) apply a 
different setup to each country,  and Athanasoulis and van Wincoop (2001) decompose unpredictable output 
shocks.  
  However,  financial  markets in most developing and transition economies are 
underdeveloped and inefficient, and the PRC is no exception (Allen et al. 2005, Guariglia and 
Poncet 2008. Whether and how financial markets in developing countries promote risk sharing 
is thus an intriguing issue to explore. In addition, while rural–urban migration is not a prominent 
2 For example, Asdrubali et al. (1996) find that 62% of all shocks to state products in the United States are smoothed 
by financial markets. ADBI Working Paper 334    Du, He, and Rui 
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issue in industrialized nations, it is very important for a  developing economy  that  is  being 
transformed  from a dual economy to an industrialized one. It will  thus be interesting to 
investigate whether rural–urban migration has helped to achieve  interprovincial consumption 
risk sharing.   
Studying  the PRC  may help us understand the relationship between uneven regional 
development and interprovincial risk sharing. Economic development is typically uneven over 
time and across regions in most developing economies. In the past three decades, the PRC’s 
economic growth has been accompanied by increasing regional disparity. Thus, studying risk-
sharing channels in the PRC could further clarify the effect of unequal regional development on 
interprovincial  consumption risk sharing; this  could have implications for other developing 
countries. 
In this study, we find that consumption risk sharing in the PRC  has  remained low and not 
improved since the 1990s. Coastal and inland areas do not exhibit striking differences in the 
extent of risk sharing achieved. However, they do display salient differences in the channels 
through which risk sharing is consummated. Coastal areas have engaged in higher risk sharing 
through the fiscal transfer system than have  inland areas. The development of financial 
intermediaries and capital markets play a modest role in risk sharing. In addition, only coastal 
areas have experienced better risk sharing due to recent development of capital markets. 
Although informal finance is instrumental to regional economic growth,
3
Only a few studies have investigated the degree  of consumption risk sharing in the PRC. 
Boyreau-Debray and Wei (2005) found that the degree of intra-PRC consumption risk sharing 
declined during the past decade. Xu (2008) provides evidence that less risk sharing takes place 
between  provinces in the PRC  than  for  states in the United States (US) and  Canadian 
provinces. Our analysis extends the existing literature in several dimensions. First, to the best of 
our knowledge, this study represents the first attempt to comprehensively investigate the 
patterns of risk sharing through various channels in the PRC. Second, a wide array of indicators 
is used to capture the size and quality of the financial system and its role in risk sharing. We 
conducted a careful investigation of the consumption risk-sharing patterns and related them to 
the progress of financial market development across time and regions. Finally, we investigated 
the importance of industrialization and urbanization to interprovincial risk sharing, and explored 
and discussed the possible roles played by rural–urban migration and remittances by migrant 
laborers in risk sharing. 
 it has depressed the 
degree  of risk sharing. A possible reason  for this  is that informal finance is sustained by 
reputational concerns and long-term relationships. Hence, cross-regional private capital flows 
are more likely to be dominated by business transactions within the local business community. 
This means that informal finance makes less of a contribution to interprovincial risk sharing. 
Consistent with the evidence of international risk sharing, foreign direct investment (FDI) does 
not enhance risk sharing overall. A rather interesting finding is that the remittances of migrant 
laborers may play an important part in enhancing consumption risk sharing, especially for inland 
provinces.  Although this is a risk-sharing channel with Chinese characteristics, it  has 
implications for other developing countries. Our results suggest that unlike  the situation in 
industrialized economies, the PRC  capital markets have played at most a modest role in 
achieving consumption risk  sharing. In contrast, cross-regional  remittances as a product of 
rural–urban migration probably constitute the primary channel for consumption risk sharing in 
inland areas of the PRC. 
                                                 
3 Allen, Qian, and Qian (2005) argue that in spite of apparent state dominance, a sufficient number of alternative 
informal financial mechanisms have emerged to allow the overall financial system to function effectively. ADBI Working Paper 334    Du, He, and Rui 
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This study is also related to the literature on consumption behavior in response to risks and the 
impact of rural–urban migration in the PRC. Park (2005) finds that uncertainty about future 
consumption prices for grain contributes to a significant proportion of grain storage in the PRC’s 
poor areas. Giles (2006 demonstrates that households in villages with stronger connections to 
migrant markets have better insurance against shocks to farm production and have less variable 
income and consumption. Giles and Yoo (2007) tested the precautionary behavior of rural 
households in consumption decisions and found that an increased village migrant network 
allows households to engage in less precautionary saving. This study differs from these earlier 
studies in several dimensions. Rather than focusing on household behavior, we frame  our 
discussion in the context of interprovincial risk sharing. We treat cross-regional rural–urban 
migration as one potential channel for interprovincial risk sharing. The study examines its 
significance in achieving interprovincial risk sharing in conjunction with other potential channels, 
constructing a prism through which we can understand its relative importance in promoting 
interprovincial consumption risk sharing. It also compares the significance of cross-regional 
migration in attaining interprovincial risk sharing between inland and coastal areas over time.  
Section 2 of this paper discusses various potential risk-sharing channels in the PRC. Section 3 
discusses the measurement of risk sharing and econometric issues involved. The data are 
introduced and the variables are presented in Section 4. Section 5 presents an overview of risk 
sharing through fiscal and nonfiscal channels in the PRC in different areas and periods. Section 
6 explores the financial channel of risk sharing,  the impact of FDI on risk sharing, and the 
effects of rural–urban migration and wage remittance on risk sharing. Some further robust 
evidence of our results is provided in Section 7. Our conclusions are discussed in Section 8.  
2.  RISK-SHARING CHANNELS IN THE PRC 
2.1  Fiscal Transfer System 
Until 1979, the PRC fiscal system was highly centralized. Under the central planning system, 
the central government controlled almost all social resources and implemented a material 
balance system. It assigned production resources and output targets to each region, but at the 
same time took away most of the revenues generated from local production activities. The 
provincial governments had no control over their budgets.  
With the onset of economic reform at the end of the 1970s, the central government initiated 
waves of fiscal decentralization and gave  provinces much more discretionary power over 
regional budgets. Fiscal decentralization was carried out gradually in several phases. From 
1980 to 1993, a fiscal contract system was established to govern the fiscal relationship between 
the central and provincial governments. Under this system, fiscal revenue consisted of central 
and local revenue. According to the agreement reached in negotiations with the central 
government, local governments were allowed to keep part of the local fiscal revenue and pass 
over  the remainder to the central government. The contractual arrangement varied across 
provinces and over time depending on local revenue-generating capacity and actual budgetary 
expenditure needs. Although the statutory tax rates and tax bases were still controlled by the 
central government, provincial governments could alter the effective  tax revenues collected. 
They often provided a variety of tax concessions to local enterprises or shifted funds to their 
extrabudgetary revenue accounts, thereby minimizing the budgetary revenues that they were 
obliged to remit to the central government.
4
                                                 
4 Almost all revenues were collected by the local tax bureaus (Ma and Norregaard 1998). 
 The fiscal contract system resulted in the central 
government losing  its dominant control over the national budgetary system. With dwindling ADBI Working Paper 334    Du, He, and Rui 
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budgetary revenues, the ratio of central revenue to total revenue declined from 38% in 1985 to 
22% in 1993.
5
The drastic decline in central government revenue put the interprovincial fiscal transfer system 
under mounting pressure; this was unfavorable to risk sharing through this channel. To increase 
the fiscal capacity of the central government, a reform of the tax system was launched in 1994 
to separate tax into that collected by the central government, by local governments, and by 
both. Under this new scheme, local revenue was redefined as consisting of exclusively local 
revenue and the local part of shared revenue.
 
6
An extrabudgetary revenue system runs in parallel  with  the budgetary revenue system and 
comprises tax surcharges and user fees levied by the central and local governments, in addition 
to earnings of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) (Jin et al. 2005). Because this extrabudgetary 
revenue does not have to be shared with the central government, it provides local governments 
with  greater autonomy over expenditure. This then reduces the power of fiscal transfers to 
achieve interprovincial risk sharing. The role of the fiscal transfer system in interprovincial risk 
sharing may not be stable over time due to the extrabudgetary revenue system.  
 As this separate tax system allowed the central 
government to take charge of the main types of tax in the PRC, the share of central government 
revenue increased to around 55.7% in 1994 (National Bureau of Statistical 2004). This increase 
in central budgetary revenue is likely  to have promoted interprovincial  fiscal transfers  and 
contributed to risk sharing across regions.  
2.2  Formal Financial System 
Formal finance mainly consists of formal systems of indirect and direct finance. The extent of 
indirect finance is reflected in the development of financial intermediaries. Direct finance refers 
to growth in the capital market. 
2.2.1  Financial Intermediary Development  
Financial intermediation in the PRC is dominated by the banking system. According to a Federal 
Reserve Bank of San Francisco (2007) estimate,
7
In the era of the centrally planned economy, banks were not independent business entities, but 
simply served as cashiers for the fiscal system. The banking system has undergone several 
phases of reform  since the  economy was  liberalized.  During  1979–1983, the government 
restored the two-tier banking system comprising a central bank and several major state-owned 
commercial banks. During  1984–1993,  the government promoted the establishment of 
shareholding banks and encouraged competition among various types of banks. The most 
important banking reform period took place from 1994 to 2003, with the central government 
setting  up a market-oriented banking system. A series of measures were implemented to 
achieve this. Policy banks were established to focus on policy-dictated loan extensions and 
commercial banks were pushed to become market-oriented business entities. Standard 
 commercial banks provided 85% of the total 
capital raised by corporations in the PRC in 2006. The ratio of bank deposits to GDP is 
extremely high and is far in excess of that in any other country (Kuijs 2005). Most bank credit is 
controlled by state-owned banks and is directed to SOEs.  
                                                 
5  This resulted in an  imbalance in the  development of  regional economies  and phenomena such as local 
protectionism, tax evasion, expansion of extrabudgetary revenue, and growth of regional differences. 
6 For example, based on this new tax-sharing formula, all provinces are required to remit 75% of their revenue 
collected from the value-added tax, the most important tax source in the PRC. 
7 Prospects for China’s Corporate Bond Market, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco Economic Letter, Number 
2007–07, 16 March 2007.  ADBI Working Paper 334    Du, He, and Rui 
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accounting principles and prudential norms were created to support the financial sector reforms, 
and licenses were granted to foreign banks and non-state-owned commercial banks to promote 
competition in banking. From 2004 to the present, further banking reforms were introduced, 
following the PRC’s accession to the World Trade Organization. These reforms mainly involved 
restructuring state-owned commercial banks into shareholding banks and introducing overseas 
strategic investors. As a consequence, several state-owned commercial banks were 
transformed into state-controlled commercial banks that were publicly listed either domestically 
or overseas (Berger et al. 2009).  
2.2.2  Capital Market Development 
Capital markets mainly refer to the bond and equity markets. Corporate bonds were first issued 
in the PRC in 1986, yet the bond market has remained underdeveloped. According to the China 
Securities Regulatory Commission, the value of corporate bond issues in 2007 equated to only 
2.05% of GDP. 
In contrast, the equity market has developed rather quickly. Although set up later than the bond 
market, the newly established Shanghai Stock Exchange and Shenzhen Stock Exchange have 
expanded rapidly since their formation in the early 1990s. The ratio of market capitalization to 
GDP was only 3.93% in 1992, but surged to 132.65% by 2007. The introduction of stock 
markets was initially aimed at generating fresh capital for the ailing SOEs. However, since the 
late 1990s, the central government has promoted the partial privatization of SOEs and 
encouraged private enterprises to go public. The amount of equity funds channeled to the 
private sector has continued to rise. 
2.3  Informal Financial System 
The formal financial system in the PRC has long been characterized by state domination and 
financial repression. In this system, banking and the financial markets have mainly served the 
funding needs of SOEs and the majority of the non-state sector has been denied access to 
formal finance.  
Given the rapid growth of the nonstate sector, Allen et al. (2005) suggest that alternative 
financing channels and corporate governance mechanisms  must be operating in the PRC’s 
private sector. Built upon reputational concerns and long-term relationships, informal finance 
has supported the rapid expansion of the nonstate sector and contributed most to the growth of 
the economy. If informal finance is mobile across regions and a large proportion of it flows to 
regions where capital is scarce due to the underdevelopment of the formal financial system, 
then it is expected to promote interprovincial risk sharing. However, if informal finance is mainly 
locally  based due to its relationship-based nature and is more prevalent in more-developed 
regions, then we cannot anticipate that informal finance will promote interprovincial risk sharing.  
2.4  Financial Globalization 
After summarizing theoretical models in open economy macroeconomics and international 
finance, Kose et al. (2009) posit that financial globalization could in theory foster risk sharing 
across countries  because it provides increased opportunities for countries to smooth 
consumption growth in the face of idiosyncratic fluctuations in income growth. As a central part 
of the process of financial globalization, FDI could potentially affect interprovincial risk sharing ADBI Working Paper 334    Du, He, and Rui 
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within a country.
8
2.5  Industrialization and Urbanization 
 Harrison et al. (2004) suggest that firms in countries with larger FDI inflows 
are less constrained by external finance limitations. Applying the same logic to different 
provinces in the PRC, we expect FDI inflow to relieve the shortage of capital and generate new 
employment and income, thus reducing the impact of negative regionwide shocks on the well-
being of regional residents. According to Poncet (2007), the PRC’s annual capital inflows have 
exceeded US$40 billion since 1996, gradually increasing to around US$70 billion in 2005 and 
2006. As the PRC is the world’s largest single recipient of FDI, FDI is expected to smooth 
consumption by acting as an important source of external finance. However, He et al. (2009) 
find that FDI allocation across regions is rather imbalanced, with the coastal regions receiving 
the majority. This uneven geographical distribution may diminish the positive impact of FDI on 
interprovincial risk sharing if FDI inflow is highly correlated with domestic capital investment 
distribution. Thus, the impact of FDI on interprovincial risk sharing may not be even across 
regions in the PRC. Under some circumstances, as FDI has been an important growth engine in 
the PRC, the persistence of uneven FDI inflow distribution may actually contribute to the 
concerted movement of consumption and output growth and worsen interprovincial risk sharing.  
The problems of surplus labor and a shortage of land are more serious in the PRC than in most 
other developing countries. The pace of urbanization was fairly slow from 1949 to 1982 because 
of the rapid growth of the rural population and tight administrative restrictions on rural–urban 
migration under the household registration system. The proportion of urban dwellers in the total 
population grew slowly from 13.3% in 1952 to 20.6% in 1982. However, the economic reforms 
of the latter twentieth century led to urbanization and industrialization, such that between 1982 
and 1986 the urban population increased dramatically to account for 37% of the total population. 
National census figures show that the country had more than 200 million migrant laborers in 
2006.  A major cause of this large jump was the  migration of large numbers of surplus 
agricultural workers from rural to urban areas following a series of liberalization reforms in rural 
areas, such as the household responsibility system (Zhao 2003).  The industrialization  and 
urbanization process has encouraged large numbers of redundant rural laborers to leave 
farming and the countryside to move either to cities within the same province or to the booming 
coastal provinces and cities (this form of migration is called litu lixiang). However, because of 
the household registration system (Hukou),
9
In the early stage of rural–urban migration in the reform era, redundant rural laborers usually 
moved to work in rural enterprises in nearby villages or townships. However, rural enterprises 
were not able to keep  absorbing  surplus labor and,  in the late 1980s,  job creation in rural 
 these migrant workers do not officially migrate to 
cities, but only take temporary jobs there. Typically, they remit a large part of their wages to their 
families in the countryside. Hence, rural–urban migration has substantially altered the sources 
of household income in rural areas, especially in poorer inland provinces. The remittance of 
nonfarming income by migrant labor has become an increasingly important source of income for 
rural households (de Brauw and Giles 2008) and, at the same time, an effective instrument for 
interprovincial risk sharing.  
                                                 
8 Foreign portfolio flows into the PRC are rather limited in size because the PRC’s capital account has not been 
liberalized. Hence, FDI is the primary form of capital inflow. It also has the largest potential impact on employment 
and income in recipient provinces.   
9 The Hukou system is one of the social control and administration systems set up for households in rural and urban 
areas. Members must register at the local public security office as legal residents. After registration, households are 
issued a Hukou certificate on which all members of the family are listed in detail as legal residents. This means that 
they can be more closely controlled by the local street office in urban areas or by the village committee in rural areas 
(Chen and Ravallion 1999).  ADBI Working Paper 334    Du, He, and Rui 
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enterprises started to decline. Meanwhile, the big cities were starting to attract an increasing 
number of rural laborers due to the acceleration of industrialization and relaxation of regulations 
on the employment of migrant workers. Increasing numbers of rural laborers moved to the big 
urban centers, initially to those in their own province (Garcia 2004). While this type of movement 
increased rural household incomes, its contribution to interprovincial risk sharing was rather 
limited from the provincial perspective. We thus expect that rural migration to urban areas did 
not cause a large increase in risk sharing in the 1980s.  
The large-scale movement of labor across provinces began after Deng Xiaoping’s tour of 
southern PRC in early 1992 to launch a new round of economic reforms that further promoted 
industrialization and urbanization. Since then, increasing numbers of migrant workers have 
flowed from rural areas—especially those in the inland provinces—to large urban areas, 
particularly those lying along the east coast. As a consequence, the share of total rural net 
income accounted for by nonfarming income increased substantially from 26% in 1990 to 58% 
in 2006 (National Bureau of Statistics 2007). This not only reflects the industrialization process, 
but more importantly is evidence of the increasing value of remittances made by migrant 
workers to their families. Giles and Yoo (2007) suggest that households in rural areas engage in 
less precautionary saving as the migrant network increases. This wave of interprovincial rural–
urban migration is likely to have improved risk sharing in the inland provinces.  
3.  MEASURING RISK SHARING 
Athanasoulis and van Wincoop (2001) developed a variance decomposition method to measure 
risk sharing  and applied  it to the US. The basic idea of this method is to break down the 
reduction in cross-sectional income and consumption variability into various channels including 
capital markets, the fiscal transfer system, credit markets, and the unshared proportion. 
To see how this procedure works, let us consider a country with I  regions. Let  it y  be per capita 
regional output (income before risk sharing) in period t. The growth rate of region  s i'  output 
from t to  s t +  is calculated as  it s t i s t t i y y g ln ln , , , − = + + . Without imposing any structure, we can 
express the output growth rate as the sum of a predictable component and an unpredictable 
component: 
                       s t t i it s s t t i z g + + + ′ + = , , , , ε λ α ,                                               (1) 
where α  is a constant and vector  it z  is the information set at time t  used to predict future 
growth.   
Even with complete risk sharing, the households in each region remain exposed to the national 
aggregate risks. Thus, what matters for our research is the extent to which a province’s growth 
rate deviates from the national growth rate. Using equation (1), we can write the deviation of the 
growth rate in region i from the national rate as  




s t t s t t i z z g g + + + + − ′ = − , , , , , ) ( µ λ ,                                            (2) ADBI Working Paper 334    Du, He, and Rui 
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where the superscript N  represents the corresponding national variable
10
N
s t t s t t i s t t i + + + − = , , , , , ε ε µ
  and 
 refers to the residual risk.  
When all households are equally risk averse, they are identically exposed to the national risk 
and the residual risk  s t t i + , , µ  should thus be eliminated. Hence, the risk sharing achieved through 
a particular channel can be gauged by the extent to which it reduces the uncertainty of the 
residual risk s t t i + , , µ .
11
s t t i + , , µ   To obtain the estimation of , we must assume an artificial 
representative region with an average residual risk
12
s t t i + , , µ   and that the innovations   with 
nonoverlapping intervals ] , [ s t t +  are all independently drawn from the residual risk distribution 
in this representative region. The residual risk of the representative region is assumed to follow 
a  ) , 0 (
2
s N σ  distribution.
13
We use the representative region’s standard deviation of residual risk 
  
s σ  as a measure of the 
diversifiable risk. The amount of risk sharing accomplished through the fiscal transfer channel 
and the nonfiscal channels can then be measured by the extent to which they each reduce the 
standard deviation of residual risk.  
The estimation procedure is as follows. We first choose the variables in vector  it z  (the 
information set). For each horizon s , we run a panel regression for equation (2) using all of the 
intervals in the sample that do not overlap. Let µ ˆ  be the stacked vector of the residual risk for a 
given horizon. We estimate the average variance in the residual risk over all regions as that of 
the representative region  ( ) ) /( ˆ ˆ
2 λ µ µ σ − ′ = IH s , where H  is the number of observations in each 
region and λ  is the number of variables in information set z . By comparing the diversifiable risk 
before and after risk sharing, we can compute the reduction in the standard deviation as the 




                                                 




1θ  for any 
regional variable i x .  j θ is the weight for region j, which is the proportion region  s j'  endowment represents of the 
national endowment.  
11 This methodology is comparable to that of Asdrubali et al. (1996), as both are based on the same measures of 
income before and after risk sharing. 
12 Because we do not impose much structure on the endowment process, the variance in residual risk in each region 
cannot be computed for a sufficiently long horizon. For example, more than 20 years of data have only one 
observation of 20-year growth per region. 
13 This is an unconditional distribution. Conditional on each region, the distribution of  s t t i + , , µ  is generally different.  
14 For further details, please refer to Athanasoulis and van Wincoop (2000).  ADBI Working Paper 334    Du, He, and Rui 
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4.  DATA AND VARIABLES 
4.1  Measures of Income 
Our sample consisted  of a panel of 29 provinces and provincial-level cities on the PRC 
mainland for which annual data were available.
15
(1) GDP data were drawn from the 2008 edition of the Statistical Yearbook of China.
 All of the variables were measured in per 
capita terms and expressed in 1980 constant prices by deflating them with the retail price index. 
To accurately gauge risk sharing, data were obtained on  the  following  various indicators of 
individual income. 
16
(2) Aggregate provincial income (PI) is defined as the sum of the total income of provincial 
residents and local government income before taxes and fiscal transfers.
 We 
obtained the per capita gross product of a province by dividing the aggregate regional product 
by the population in the province. We treated this as income before risk sharing as it does not 
include income sources such as fiscal transfers and asset holdings. Following ASY (1996), we 
used provincial income, disposable provincial income, and provincial consumption as measures 
of income and consumption after risk sharing. 
17 We approximated 
provincial income as the sum of disposable household income,
18   local budgetary fiscal 
revenue,
19
(3) Disposable provincial  income (DPI) consists of household disposable income and local 
government disposable income. Local government disposable income is equal to local 
budgetary revenue plus central government grants to the local government  and  local 
extrabudgetary revenue, minus local government remittances to the central government. 
 and local extrabudgetary revenue, and then derived provincial income per capita by 
dividing the regional aggregate value by the regional population.  
(4) Provincial consumption (PC) is defined as the sum of household and government 
consumption in a province. Provincial household consumption is measured as the average of 
urban and rural household living expenses. Provincial government consumption is measured as 
the sum of local budgetary expenditure and extrabudgetary expenditure.
20
Following ASY (1996), we treated the difference between PI and DPI as representing the risk 
sharing achieved through the fiscal system. This is the most clear-cut channel of risk sharing. 
Based on their observation of the situation in the US, ASY (1996) regarded  the differences 
between GDP and PI as the risk sharing attained through capital markets, and between DPI and 
 
                                                 
15 To maintain the consistency of the data on disposable income and consumption, we do not include Tibet and 
Chongqing, two provincial administrative regions. 
16 The Statistical Yearbook of China 2008 provides national (provincial) account data adjusted according to the 
economic census of 2004. This source gives consistent data for 1980–2007.  
17 Following Asdrubali et al. (1996), we excluded the retained earnings in our measure of provincial income (PI). As 
Athanasoulis and van Wincoop (2001) point out, not including retained earnings is not an issue. Retained earnings 
are an investment that contributes to dividends in the future, which are captured in pretax provincial income. To 
provide a sensitive analysis, we included retained earnings in both provincial income and disposable provincial 
income.  
18 Household disposable income is measured as the average of urban household disposable income and rural 
household net income.  
19 The measurement of local budgetary revenue is inconsistent because of the implementation of the separate tax 
system in 1994. In accordance with the Finance Yearbook of China, we estimated local budgetary revenue after 
1993 as the sum of local revenue plus consumption tax and 75% of value-added tax collected. 
20  Budgetary (extrabudgetary) revenue consists of central budgetary (extrabudgetary) and local budgetary 
(extrabudgetary) revenue. ADBI Working Paper 334    Du, He, and Rui 
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PC as the risk sharing attained from credit markets. However, this classification of nonfiscal 
channels may not be appropriate for the PRC. For instance, the PRC has the world’s highest 
household savings rate and consumer credit is far less popular and relevant than it is in the US. 
This suggests that it may not be reasonable to attribute the difference between DPI and PC 
primarily to the effect of consumption smoothing via the credit markets. For example, large 
numbers of migrant workers flock to the coastal areas from the inland provinces and send 
money back to their families in their home provinces. This could certainly create a large 
discrepancy between GDP and PI that is not caused by asset investment in capital markets.   
Given the complexity of the risk-sharing channels in the PRC, we adopted the approach of 
classifying all of the potential channels into either fiscal or nonfiscal channels. In our opinion, the 
fiscal channel is  the most straightforward and least controversial, whereas the  nonfiscal 
channels are a catch-all category for all other potential channels.  
In our analysis, we first estimated the contribution of the fiscal and nonfiscal channels to risk 
sharing. We then explored the various potential channels in the nonfiscal channels category 
including capital markets, credit markets, informal finance, globalization, and industrialization 
and urbanization. By using various indicators of these nonfiscal channels, we extended  our 
regression models to evaluate their direct effects on the degree of risk sharing.
21
To measure local disposable income and consumption, we first used data collected from the 
rural and urban household survey yearbooks, which provide data on disposable income and 
consumption for urban and rural households in each province. The corresponding figures for 
government income and consumption are drawn from the provincial yearbooks. As all of the 
data series are stated in nominal terms, we deflated them by the relevant provincial retail price 
index (RPI). 
 
Table 1: Summary Statistics for the Measures of Risk Sharing 
Item  GDP  PI  DPI  PC 
Mean  0.090  0.072  0.075  0.070 
Volatility   0.057  0.055  0.057  0.059 
Note: Mean and volatility are defined as the mean and standard deviation of the first difference in log real per capita terms 
for each province. GDP is the per capita gross provincial product. PI is the aggregate provincial income defined as the 
sum of the total income of provincial residents and local government income before taxes and fiscal transfer. DPI is 
disposable provincial income and consists of household disposable income and local government disposable income. 
Local government disposable income is equal to local budgetary revenue plus central government grants to the local 
government and local extrabudgetary revenue minus local government remittances to the central government. PC is 
provincial consumption, defined as the sum of household consumption and government consumption in a province. 
Provincial household consumption is measured as the average of urban household living expenses and rural household 
living expenses. Provincial government consumption is measured as the sum of local budgetary expenditure and 
extrabudgetary expenditure. 
Source: Authors 
Table 1 presents the summary statistics for each measure of income and consumption after risk 
sharing. All of the data are expressed in the first difference in logarithm real per capita terms. 
Average regional GDP  growth is  9% and average  consumption growth 7%. The average 
standard deviation of regional GDP is 0.057 and consumption growth is 0.059; these are much 
                                                 
21 It should be kept in mind that measurement errors do not result in biased estimates of fiscal smoothing. As our 
measurements influence PI and DPI proportionately, the standard error reduction specification is thus an 
appropriate measure of fiscal effect. However, since some nonfiscal channels are controlled by the government 
such as financial intermediary, capital market, and FDI, the impact of fiscal transfer on interprovincial risk sharing 
could be underestimated.  ADBI Working Paper 334    Du, He, and Rui 
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higher than in industrial countries.
22 A distinct feature is that the volatility of consumption is 
slightly higher than that of each of the income measures.
23
4.2  Measuring Nonfiscal Risk-Sharing Channels 
 This may imply less risk sharing in 
the PRC than in other economies. 
Formal finance mainly consists of financial intermediaries and capital markets. We use the 
following three ratios to measure the extent of financial intermediation  development:  loan, 
deposit, and saving. Loan is the ratio of total (bank and nonbank) loans to GDP and measures 
the overall size of the credit markets. Deposit is the ratio of total savings deposited in financial 
institutions to GDP. Saving is the ratio of household savings in financial institutions to GDP.
24
We employ two measures, issuance and capitalization, to capture the importance of capital 
markets. Issuance is the ratio of funds raised by issuing equities and nonfinancial corporate 
bonds (long-term and short-term) to GDP in each province. This ratio is chosen because the 
issuance of equities and corporate bonds is argued to be a primary function of capital markets 
(Hasan et al. 2009). Capitalization is the ratio of the stock market capitalization of listed firms 
registered in each province to the GDP of that province; it captures the depth of capital markets. 
 
These three measures reflect the scale of financial intermediation from the perspective of assets 
and liabilities.  
Informal finance refers to alternative sources of finance that are tapped when access to the 
formal financial system is prohibited or restricted. As a proxy for informal finance, we employ the 
ratio of private overall investment to fixed-asset investment, or the proportion of fixed-asset 
investment accounted for by private investment (PI). The use of this proxy is motivated by Allen 
et al. (2005), who show that the private sector in the PRC is extremely limited in its ability to 
gain access to formal finance, but at the same time is the most vibrant growth engine in the 
economy. This indicates the need for efficient and alternative financing channels to support 
rapid expansion of the private sector. We believe that private sector investment reflects the size 
of informal finance and adopted this ratio to gauge its importance in each province. We used the 
ratio of FDI stock to GDP to proxy for financial globalization (FDI).  
Finally, we employed four ratios to capture the impacts of industrialization, urbanization, and 
interprovincial rural–urban migration on consumption risk sharing in our analysis. Urban1 is the 
ratio of disposable income per capita to the gross output value of farming, forestry, and 
husbandry per capita in a province, where higher values indicate that  nonfarming income 
accounts for a higher proportion of total disposable income. Urban2 is constructed as 1 minus 
the ratio of the gross output value of farming, forestry, and husbandry to GDP, where a higher 
value clearly corresponds to a higher proportion of nonfarming income. Urban3 is the ratio of 
migration outflow to migration inflow based on provincial migration data from the national 
census. A higher value indicates labor emigration to other provinces on a larger scale and 
makes it more likely that the province in question is a major supplier of migrant workers. Urban4 
is the ratio of migration outflow to migration inflow based on the linear interpolation. The first two 
ratios may well incorporate the impacts of industrialization, urbanization, and rural–urban 
migration on the structure of household income. The last two ratios are the proxies for 
                                                 
22 Crucini and Hess (2000) report that consumption volatility for Canadian provinces and Japanese prefectures is 
about 2%. 
23 Boyreau-Debray and Wei (2005) and He et al. (2009) also report that consumption is more volatile than output. 
24 Chen (2006) suggests that household savings are less likely to be influenced by government policy than are total 
loans and deposits. ADBI Working Paper 334    Du, He, and Rui 
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interprovincial rural–urban migration and the importance of migrant workers’ remittances back 
home.  
4.3  Control Variables 
  The explanatory variables included in the information set  it z  are mainly drawn from the 
empirical literature on growth. Based on the growth literature (see, for example, Barro and Sala-
i-Martin [1995] for a review) and its application to the PRC, we constructed and included the 
following variables in the base information set.
25
1Y ∆
 YI is the logarithm of initial real GDP per capita. 
GPO is the 5-year lagged population growth rate. G/Y is the ratio of government expenditure to 
GDP. FERT is the ratio of the number of births to the total population.  is the 1-year lagged 
growth rate of real GDP per capita. Edu is the secondary school enrollment ratio. I/Y is the ratio 
of investment to GDP. We include initial GDP per capita to capture the convergence in per 
capita income across provinces. The population growth and secondary school enrollment 
variables reflect the growth in labor resources and human capital. Investment and government 
expenditure are presumed to be growth engines. The summary statistics for our variables are 
reported in Table 2. 
                                                 
25 As most of the nonfiscal indicators are available only from 1990, they were excluded from the base information set. 
One may argue that the problem of omitted variables may influence the estimation of residuals. Nonetheless, it is 
less of a concern to our estimation of residual risk reduction as the information set influences the residuals of each 
income category proportionately. To be precise, various specifications of the information set are used to estimate 
residual risk reduction. The alternative specifications leave our main results unchanged. ADBI Working Paper 334    Du, He, and Rui 
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Table 2: Summary Statistics for the Explanatory Variables 
 
Item        Mean  SD  Minimu
m 
Maximum  Obs 
Nonfiscal Indicators                     
Credit Market:  Loans  0.994  0.269  0.547  2.258  522 












Capital Market:  Issuance  0.012  0.030  0.000  0.557  521 
  Capitalization  0.327  0.878  0.004  16.484  435 
Informal Finance:  FDI  0.082  0.093  0.000  0.594  521 
  PI  0.154  0.072  0.004  0.411  522 
Urbanization:  Urban1  1.320  0.889  0.465  7.363  522 
  Urban2  0.693  0.134  0.329  0.979  522 
  Urban3  2.564  2.896  0.038  12.261  78 
Control Variables           
YI  7.163  0.854  5.380  9.813  812 
GPO  0.014  0.012  (0.105)  0.173  812 
G/Y  0.129  0.045  0.039  0.312  812 
I/Y  2.710  0.349  1.579  3.389  812 
FERT  0.086  0.058  (0.112)  0.313  812 
1Y ∆   0.852  0.140  0.372  1.048  812 
Edu  0.345  0.114  0.092  0.826  812 
( ) = negative number, Obs =          , SD =        , 
Note: This table reports the summary statistics for the variables. Loan is the ratio of total financial 
institutional loans to GDP. Deposit is the ratio of total savings deposited in financial institutions to 
GDP. Saving is the ratio of total household savings to GDP. Issuance is the ratio of funds raised 
by issuing equities and nonfinancial corporate bonds (long-term and short-term) to GDP. 
Capitalization is the ratio of stock market capitalization to GDP. FDI is the ratio of foreign direct 
investment stock to total investment. PI is the ratio of private investment to total investment. 
Urban1 is the ratio of disposable income per capita to the gross output value of farming, forestry, 
and husbandry per capita in a province. Urban2 is constructed as 1minus Urban1. Urban3 is the 
ratio of migration outflow over inflow. YI is initial real per capita GDP in log form. GPO is the 5-
year lagged population growth rate. G/Y is the ratio of government expenditure to GDP. I/Y is the 
ratio of total investment to GDP. FERT is the ratio of the number of births to the total population 
multiplied by 1,000 in log form. 1Y ∆ is the 1-year lagged real per capita GDP growth rate. Edu is 
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Table 3: Estimation Results for the 29 Provinces 
 




Variables:  OLS  GMM  OLS  GMM  OLS  OLS 
YI  -0.010**  -0.0211*  -0.052*  -0.194**  -0.184*  -0.324 
(-0.004)  (0.0127)  (-0.031)  (0.0906)  (-0.099)  (-0.214) 
GPO  0.044  0.115  1.721  -0.993  -1.79  -10.1 
(-0.117)  (0.118)  (-2.034)  (0.986)  (-7.019)  (-15.311) 
G/Y  -0.097**  -0.0261  -0.448  0.231  -0.147  -0.62 
(-0.042)  (0.118)  (-0.294)  (0.318)  (-0.869)  (-2.202) 
I/Y  0.037*  0.0680  0.14  -0.149  -0.193  -0.129 
(-0.019)  (0.0420)  (-0.13)  (0.125)  (-0.468)  (-1.113) 
FERT  -0.01  -0.0309*  -0.104**  -0.0230  -0.250*  -0.136 
(-0.006)  (0.0165)  (-0.047)  (0.0511)  (-0.127)  (-0.433) 
y 1 ∆   0.183***  0.136***  0.473**  0.0751  1.719***  1.592 
(-0.034)  (0.0410)  (-0.228)  (0.0944)  (-0.618)  (-1.174) 
Edu  0.016  0.0588**  0.01  0.296**  -0.092  0.359 
(-0.011)  (0.0255)  (-0.08)  (0.125)  (-0.224)  (-0.568) 
Observati
on 
783  725  145  145  58  29 
Province  29  29  29  29  29  29 
R
2 0.053  / P-
value  0.0001  0.099  0.0586 
0.263  0.276 
ˆ σ   0.039  0.039  0.115  0.120  0.205  0.331 
 
Note: This table reports the estimation results of Equation (2). For each horizon, all of the intervals that do not overlap 
are used. The dependent variable is the extent to which the regional GDP growth rate deviates from the national 
average growth rate. YI is initial real per capita GDP in log form. GPO is the 5-year lagged population growth rate. 
G/Y is the ratio of government expenditure to GDP. I/Y is the ratio of total investment to GDP. FERT is the ratio of the 
number of births to the total population*1,000 in log form. 1Y ∆ is the 1-year lagged real per capita GDP growth rate. 
Edu is the ratio of the number of students enrolled in secondary school to the number of primary school graduates. 
The standard errors for each point estimation are reported in parentheses. The R
2
ˆs σ
 for OLS regression and P-value for 
GMM regression and  for each horizon are also reported. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 
5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
Source: Authors 
Table 3 provides the estimation results for the GDP growth rate.
26
2 0.053 R =
 The explanatory power of 
the model is rather limited over shorter horizons ( for  1  year and 0.099 for 5 
years), but increases substantially for longer horizons (
2 0.263 R = for 13 years and 0.276 for 
27 years). Consistent with Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995), the coefficients of initial GDP per 
capita  are negative for all horizons and statistically significant for most horizons. Our 
estimation provides some evidence of a conditional  convergence in growth among PRC 
provinces. The 1-year lagged growth rate of real GDP per capita produces mostly positive 
and significant estimated coefficients. As expected, the fertility rate and government 
expenditure  exert negative effects on regional growth, some of which are statistically 
significant. Most of the other variables in the information set are insignificant. The estimated 
standard deviation of residual risk ( ˆ σ ) rises substantially with the estimation horizon. With a 
5-year interval, the standard deviation is 0.115, whereas with a horizon of 27 years, the 
standard deviation is 0.330. One may suspect that a regression model with a  lagged 
                                                 
26 The estimation results for other income measures are similar, but are not reported.  ADBI Working Paper 334    Du, He, and Rui 
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dependent variable and other lagged variables  tends  to produce a  biased  estimation of 
coefficients (e.g., Forbes 2000, Banerjee and Duflo 2003). To check whether it may cause 
serious estimation bias of residual risk, we reestimated the regression model using an SYS-
GMM estimator developed by Arellano and Bover (1995).
27
5.  OVERVIEW OF RISK-SHARING PATTERNS IN THE PRC 
 The results remain qualitatively 
similar.  
5.1  The Roles of Fiscal and Nonfiscal Transfer Channels in Risk 
Sharing 
Figures 1 and 2 show the extent of total risk sharing through the various channels and the 
extent of risk sharing through the fiscal transfer channel for all of the horizons under study. 
Table 4,  panel A reports the average degree  of risk sharing attained through fiscal and 
nonfiscal channels and the remaining unsmoothed part  over the  sample period. 
Approximately 40.5% of the shocks to gross provincial output were insured through various 
channels, with the remaining 59.5 % being uninsured, a higher level of uninsured shocks 
than in the United States.
28
Figure 1: Total Interprovincial Risk Sharing in the PRC 
 This clearly indicates that substantial scope remains for potential 
welfare gains from additional risk sharing in the PRC. Moreover, the fiscal transfer channel 
insured 9.4% of the output shocks, a proportion much overshadowed by that of the nonfiscal 
channels, which suggests that government income redistribution measures play a limited 
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Note: Risk sharing is measured as the percentage reduction in the standard deviation of the ratio of gross provincial 
product to provincial consumption. 
                                                 
27 When the horizon exceeds 10 years, the panel regression reduces to two time periods. The SYS-GMM cannot 
be estimated. As a result, we only report the GMM results for horizons 1 and 5. The estimation results for other 
income measures or other horizons are similar, but are not reported. 
28 ASY (1996) reported that only 25% of shocks to gross state output are not smoothed. ADBI Working Paper 334    Du, He, and Rui 
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Source: Authors’ estimation  
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Note: Risk sharing is measured as the percentage reduction in the standard deviation of the ratio of provincial income 
to disposable provincial income. 
Source: Authors’ estimation  
5.2  Results for Subperiods 
As the PRC is transforming itself from a planned economy into a market economy in which 
government involvement in the national economy is declining, an interesting question is 
whether the respective contributions of the fiscal transfer channel and the nonfiscal channels 
to risk sharing are increasing or decreasing. We assessed this by determining whether the 
proportions of risk sharing achieved through the fiscal and nonfiscal channels varied over 
subperiods. Meanwhile, the capital markets developed rather quickly after the introduction of 
stock markets in the early 1990s. How or whether this expansion has influenced risk sharing 
is an interesting issue that remains uninvestigated. We  therefore  split the whole  sample 
period into two subperiods, i.e., 1980–1997 and 1990–2007.
29
                                                 
29 As the estimation results may hinge on the time horizon, we set each subperiod at 18 years.  
  The estimates for each 
subperiod are reported in Table 4, panel B. ADBI Working Paper 334    Du, He, and Rui 
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Table 4: Risk Sharing, 1980-2007 
Panel A  
Note:This panel reports the average, over horizons of 1 to 27 years, of the reduction in the standard 
deviation  of  residual risk achieved through risk sharing. The fiscal  transfer  channel refers to risk 
sharing through the national fiscal system and nonfiscal channel refers to risk sharing through other 
channels. The final row reports the unsmoothed part of consumption. 
: 
Item    
Fiscal Transfer Channel  9.4% 
Nonfiscal Channels  31.1% 
Not Smoothed  59.5% 
 
Panel B Subperiods 
Note: This panel reports the average, over horizons of 1 to 17 years, of the reduction in the standard 
deviation of residual risk achieved through risk sharing. To check whether there was an improvement 
in risk sharing after 1990, we divided the whole sample into two overlapping periods.  
Item  1980–1997  1990–2007 
Fiscal Transfer Channel  2.7%  4.6% 
Nonfiscal Channels  31.9%  26.1% 
Not Smoothed  55.4%  59.3% 
 
Panel C Subregions 
Note: This panel reports the average, over horizons of 1 to 27 years, of the reduction in the standard 
deviation of residual risk achieved through risk sharing. To investigate whether the channels of risk 
sharing vary across regions, we divided the whole sample into inland regions and coastal regions. 
The inland regions include Anhui, Gansu, Guangxi, Guizhou, Heilongjiang, Henan, Hubei, Hunan, 
Inner Mongolia, Jiangxi, Jilin, Ningxia, Qinghai, Shaanxi, Shanxi, Sichuan, Xinjiang, and Yunnan. The 
coastal regions  include  Beijing, Fujian, Guangdong, Hainan, Hebei, Jiangsu, Liaoning, Shandong, 
Shanghai, Tianjin, and Zhejiang. 
 
Item  Inland Regions  Coastal Regions 
Fiscal Transfer Channel  5.0%  8.0% 
Nonfiscal Channels  32.1%  26.9% 
Not Smoothed  63.9%  65.1% 
 
Panel D 
To check for robustness, we first estimated the ratio of the urban population over the rural population, 
and used  this ratio to construct the population weighted average of household consumption and 
income. We further modified our measure of both provincial income (PI) and disposable provincial 
income (DPI) by including retained earnings. We also deflated all the measure of income by using the 
spatial deflators developed by Brandt and Holtz (2006). This panel reports the average degree of risk 
sharing attained through fiscal and nonfiscal channels and the remaining unsmoothed part over the 
whole sample period based on these new measures. 
Item  1980–2007 
Fiscal Transfer Channel  8.9% 
Nonfiscal Channels  29.4% 
Not Smoothed  61.7% ADBI Working Paper 334    Du, He, and Rui 
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The proportion of risk sharing achieved through the government transfer system remained as 
small as 2.7% in the first subperiod (1980–1997). However, it increased to 4.6% in the second 
(1990–2007),
30
5.3  Results for Subgroups  
 reflecting the increased contribution of the fiscal transfer system to risk sharing 
resulting from the strengthening of the central government’s fiscal capacity in the wake of the 
transition  from a contract tax system to a separate tax system  in the mid-1990s.  The 
contribution made by the nonfiscal channels to risk sharing in the first subperiod was 31.9%, 
their contribution decreased to 26.1% in the second. Given the rapid expansion of the capital 
markets after 1990, the diminishing role of nonfiscal channels implies that the development of 
the capital markets did not improve the degree of risk sharing. Overall, risk sharing did not 
improve after 1990 and the total proportion of output shocks that were insured declined slightly 
in the second subperiod, a result that agrees with the evidence of Boyreau-Debray and Wei 
(2005) and Xu (2008). 
The PRC is characterized by very uneven regional development. An interesting question is thus 
whether the benefits arising from risk sharing are unequally distributed across regions. To 
answer this question, we classified provinces or provincial-level cities into two groups—inland 
areas and coastal areas
31
Interestingly, the nonfiscal channels have played a more important role in achieving risk sharing 
in inland areas than in coastal areas. This has enabled inland areas to achieve slightly higher 
overall consumption risk sharing. Given the limited development of  and access to financial 
markets in inland areas and the relative scarcity of FDI inflows, the larger proportion of risk 
sharing achieved through nonfiscal channels in the interior may reflect the importance of 
household savings and remittances made by migrant workers.  
—and compared  the patterns and amounts of income and 
consumption risk sharing between the two.  In general, the PRC’s economic reforms and 
opening up started in the coastal areas and gradually spread to the inland areas. In terms of the 
degree of marketization and economic development, the inland areas are still lagging coastal 
areas. The results on the regional differential in risk-sharing patterns are reported in Table 4, 
panel C. The contribution of the fiscal transfer system to risk sharing is considerably larger in 
coastal areas. This suggests that coastal areas are the major source of tax revenue for the 
central government and that tax contributions smooth out consumption growth in coastal areas 
and make it less closely correlated with output growth. What is somewhat surprising is the low 
contribution of fiscal transfers to risk sharing in inland areas. This implies that the interprovincial 
fiscal redistribution carried out by the central government is still small and far from sufficient to 
provide an adequate degree of risk sharing for residents in inland areas. 
 
                                                 
30 It is doubtful that fiscal channel risk sharing in each subperiod combined is less than that of the whole period. This 
result may be due to the fact that the estimation depends on the time horizon. Thus, only results calculated over 
the same time horizon are comparable. 
31 The inland areas include Anhui, Gansu, Guangxi, Guizhou, Heilongjiang, Henan, Hubei, Hunan, Inner Mongolia, 
Jiangxi, Jilin, Ningxia, Qinghai, Shaanxi, Shanxi, Sichuan, Xinjiang, and Yunnan. The coastal areas include Beijing, 
Fujian, Guangdong, Hainan, Hebei, Jiangsu, Liaoning, Shandong, Shanghai, Tianjin, and Zhejiang. ADBI Working Paper 334    Du, He, and Rui 
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6.  EXPLORING NONFISCAL CHANNELS 
The nonfiscal channels category is broad and encompasses many dimensions. To explicitly 
capture the role of each channel, we followed Kose et al. (2009) and used a standard risk-
sharing regression model that contains indicators of the various nonfiscal channels. 
it
N




it it y y NFC y y a c c ε γ µ + ∆ − ∆ ′ + ∆ − ∆ + = ∆ − ∆ ) log log ( ) log log ( log log , (3) 
where  a  is constant and  it NFC  is the set of indicators of nonfiscal channels in region i . A 
negative value of the coefficient vector γ  indicates that the greater the value of these nonfiscal 
channels in a region, the greater the amount of risk sharing that occurs.
32
6.1  Development of Formal Finance and Risk Sharing 
  
In Tables 5 to 8, we report the estimation results on the relationship between the development 
of formal finance and risk sharing for 1990–2007, 1990–1999, and 1998–2007.
33
                                                 
32 This is obvious because the degree of risk sharing attained by region 
  For each 
period, we conducted regressions for the whole country, coastal areas, and inland areas. 
i  is equal to it t t FO γ µ ′ − − 1 . See Sorensen et 
al. 2007. 
33 Because many observations are missing for nonfiscal data in the 1980s, we focus on 1990–2007 in the following 
regression analysis. In addition, we set the second subperiod as 1998–2007 so that it consists of 10 years in 
common with the first subperiod to facilitate econometric analysis and comparison. ADBI Working Paper 334      Du, He, and Rui 
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Table 5: Risk Sharing and the Credit Market 
  1990-2007  1990-1999  1998-2007 
Item    Loan  Deposit  Saving    Loan  Deposit  Saving    Loan  Deposit  Saving 
All Regions                       
Output  0.674***  0.744***  0.706***  0.594***  0.627***  0.876**  0.636***  0.762**  0.709***  0.936***  0.860***  0.519 
  (0.060)  (0.178)  (0.118)  (0.198)  (0.064)  (0.317)  (0.216)  (0.336)  (0.093)  (0.219)  (0.149)  (0.385) 
Output*Credit    -0.057  -0.019  0.142    -0.253  -0.009  -0.266    -0.156  -0.065  0.272 
    (0.155)  (0.089)  (0.329)    (0.315)  (0.224)  (0.678)    (0.155)  (0.069)  (0.544) 
R 0.3313 
2  0.34  0.34  0.351  0.285  0.288  0.285  0.343  0.321  0.348  0.348  0.323 
N  522  522  522  495  290  290  290  282  290  290  290  271 
Coastal Regions                       
Output  0.672***  0.622**  0.511**  -0.013  0.559***  0.485  0.329  0.017  0.810***  1.121***  0.984***  0.31 
  (0.106)  (0.249)  (0.170)  (0.223)  (0.085)  (0.393)  (0.237)  (0.464)  (0.113)  (0.193)  (0.155)  (0.542) 
Output*Credit    0.046  0.12  1.087**    0.072  0.202  1.001    -0.262  -0.099  0.642 
    (0.186)  (0.101)  (0.323)    (0.362)  (0.186)  (0.878)    (0.167)  (0.069)  (0.753) 
R 0.384 
2  0.384  0.389  0.42  0.289  0.289  0.296  0.332  0.596  0.603  0.6  0.585 
N  198  180  180  190  110  110  110  102  110  110  110  110 
Inland Regions                       
Output  0.698***  0.854***  1.137***  1.127***  0.688***  1.295***  1.392***  1.246***  0.583***  0.499  1.278***  1.236*** 
  (0.087)  (0.259)  (0.244)  (0.227)  (0.079)  (0.373)  (0.339)  (0.279)  (0.122)  (0.392)  (0.464)  (0.471) 
Output*Credit    -0.162  -0.473*  -0.821*    -0.646  -0.870**  -1.201**    0.084  -0.575  -1.120* 
    (0.246)  (0.262)  (0.403)    (0.421)  (0.407)  (0.575)    (0.349)  (0.387)  (0.658) 
R 0.302 
2  0.303  0.313  0.318  0.309  0.321  0.328  0.346  0.165  0.165  0.174  0.175 
N  324  324  324  305  180  180  180  180  180  180  180  161 
Note: This table reports the results of panel regressions based on yearly observations. Output*Credit represents the interaction of each credit market indicator and output 
growth. Loan represents the ratio of total financial institutional loans to GDP. Deposit represents the ratio of total savings deposited in financial institutions to GDP. Saving 
represents the ratio of household savings to GDP. The inland regions include Anhui, Gansu, Guangxi, Guizhou, Heilongjiang, Henan, Hubei, Hunan, Inner Mongolia, Jiangxi, 
Jilin, Ningxia, Qinghai, Shaanxi, Shanxi, Sichuan, Xinjiang, and Yunnan. The coastal regions include Beijing, Fujian, Guangdong, Hainan, Hebei, Jiangsu, Liaoning, 
Shandong, Shanghai, Tianjin, and Zhejiang. The regressions include both province-fixed effects and time effects. The standard errors robust to heteroscedasticity are 
reported in brackets. The symbols ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
Source: Authors ADBI Working Paper 334    Du, He, and Rui 
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Table 5 presents the estimation results for credit markets. To facilitate comparison with earlier 
analysis and previous studies, in the first column for  each subperiod we report panel 
regressions without the interaction terms between the output and credit market development 
indicators. The estimation results are broadly consistent with results reported in the previous 
section. Compared with the evidence of Kose et al. (2009), the extent of regional risk sharing 
across PRC provinces is consistent with that across the national boundaries of industrial 
countries. By examining the estimated coefficients of the output growth variable,
34
Table  5  also presents  estimation results that include the interaction terms between each 
measure of credit market development and output growth. For the full sample period, the 
interaction coefficients for bank loans and bank deposits are negative but  statistically 
insignificant for the whole country, positive but insignificant for the coastal areas, and negative 
for inland areas. The estimated coefficient for bank deposits is statistically significant for inland 
areas. Similarly, household savings in banks are statistically significant in promoting risk sharing 
in inland areas, but repress it in coastal areas. Hence, financial intermediary development has 
played a modest role in risk sharing across regions in the PRC and contributed to risk sharing in 
inland areas to a much greater extent than in coastal areas. These results, particularly those 
associated with bank loans, imply that the capital mobility attained by interprovincial credit 
allocation among financial intermediaries remained fairly low in the last two decades, which is 
consistent with the evidence of Boyreau-Debray and Wei (2005).  
 we can see 
that the inland areas achieved a level of consumption risk sharing comparable with that of the 
coastal areas over the whole sample period. Moreover, turning to the two subperiods, we find 
that  the extent of risk sharing  appears to have declined over time  in the whole country on 
average and in coastal areas, with risk sharing in the last decade being smaller than that in the 
1990s. In contrast, risk sharing in the inland areas increased slightly in the second subperiod in 
comparison with that in the first subperiod.   
Looking at the two subperiods, we found no significant differences between them for the country 
as a whole  and  for  coastal areas. Bank deposits significantly enhanced consumption risk 
sharing in the inland areas during 1990–1999, but their stimulant effect became statistically 
insignificant during 1998–2007. Nonetheless, household savings in banks exerted a statistically 
significant stimulant effect on risk sharing in inland areas in both subperiods. 
The failure of bank loans to promote risk sharing may reflect the structural characteristics of the 
PRC’s  financial system. In  past decades, state-owned financial institutions dominated the 
financial system and their main mission was to provide loans to SOEs. Although state banks 
tended to allocate financial resources from one region to another in accordance with the 
national government’s regional development objectives, the relatively heavy concentration of 
SOEs in the booming coastal areas reduced the amount of credit made available in  less 
productive inland areas and encouraged loans to flow within coastal areas, a pattern that 
partially weakened the role of bank loans in fostering risk sharing across inland and coastal 
areas. The liberalization of the financial system in the late 1990s did not change this situation. 
Bank restructuring and the resultant increasing profit incentive prompted state banks to act like 
nonstate or foreign banks in  shunning policy-oriented loan allocations and channeling more 
credit to the booming coastal areas. This did not help to enhance interprovincial risk sharing in 
coastal and inland areas. The well-developed consumer credit market in coastal areas also 
allowed for the relaxation of individual financing constraints, which led to higher risk sharing 
along the eastern seaboard. 
                                                 
34 A larger value indicates a higher degree of co-movement between output and consumption growth and thus less 
risk sharing. ADBI Working Paper 334    Du, He, and Rui 
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It is noteworthy that bank deposits and household savings in banks in particular played a 
striking  role in  improving  interprovincial risk sharing in  inland areas. On the one hand, this 
suggests that the high savings of enterprises, government entities, and households in particular 
in the formal financial system have contributed to the smoothing of consumption for residents in 
inland areas. On the other hand, the salient role played by household savings in banks in 
achieving risk sharing in inland areas may well reflect the importance of the  remittances of 
migrant laborers in coastal areas made to their families in inland areas in promoting risk sharing 
in inland areas. As households in inland areas tend to deposit much of their income in banks, a 
large proportion of which comes from remittances, their consumption does not move in tandem 
with their income growth. Remittances, working through household savings, play a major role in 
fostering risk sharing. This part of our evidence reinforces what we find in Section 8. ADBI Working Paper 334      Du, He, and Rui 
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Table 6: Risk Sharing and the Capital Market 
  1990–2007  1990–1999  1998–2007 
Item  Issuance  Capitalization  Issuance  Capitalization  Issuance  Capitalization 
All Regions             
Output  0.654***  0.693***  0.563***  0.660***  0.755***  0.723*** 
  (0.068)  (0.074)  (0.089)  (0.089)  (0.099)  (0.107) 
Output*CM  -1.652  -0.056  -2.39  -0.554  -2.331  -0.031 
  (2.435)  (0.074)  (6.245)  (0.343)  (1.835)  (0.076) 
R 0.307 
2  0.333  0.233  0.282  0.331  0.321 
N  492  434  261  202  289  290 
Coastal Regions             
Output  0.744***  0.753***  0.628***  0.665***  0.874***  0.874*** 
  (0.092)  (0.103)  (0.125)  (0.151)  (0.127)  (0.093) 
Output*CM  -5.691*  -0.152**  -4.279  -0.282  -3.835**  -0.104* 
  (3.463)  (0.068)  (6.631)  (0.482)  (1.863)  (0.059) 
R 0.418 
2  0.421  0.29  0.372  0.602  0.566 
N  187  171  99  83  110  110 
Inland Regions             
Output  0.636***  0.706***  0.593***  0.812***  0.638***  0.549** 
  (0.123)  (0.120)  (0.143)  (0.186)  (0.147)  (0.216) 
Output*CM  -0.423  -0.19  -2.157  -2.562  -3.031  0.11 
  (11.199)  (0.507)  (13.877)  (1.837)  (10.014)  (0.731) 
R 0.255 
2  0.257  0.214  0.257  0.177  0.165 
N  305  263  162  119  179  180 
Note: This table reports the results of panel regressions based on yearly observations. Output*CM represents the interaction between output and each capital market 
indicator. Issuance is the ratio of funds raised by issuing equities and nonfinancial corporate bonds (long-term and short-term) to GDP and Capitalization is the ratio of stock 
market capitalization to GDP. The inland regions include Anhui, Gansu, Guangxi, Guizhou, Heilongjiang, Henan, Hubei, Hunan, Inner Mongolia, Jiangxi, Jilin, Ningxia, 
Qinghai, Shaanxi, Shanxi, Sichuan, Xinjiang, and Yunnan. The coastal regions include Beijing, Fujian, Guangdong, Hainan, Hebei, Jiangsu, Liaoning, Shandong, Shanghai, 
Tianjin, and Zhejiang. The regressions include both province-fixed effects and time effects. The standard errors robust to heteroscedasticity are reported in brackets. The 
symbols ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
Source: Authors ADBI Working Paper 334    Du, He, and Rui 
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Table 6 investigates the impacts of capital market development on risk sharing. The interaction 
coefficients of funds raised through securities issuance and output growth and those of stock 
market capitalization and output growth are negative but insignificant across the country as a 
whole  and  in  inland areas  for the sample periods.  This suggests that capital market 
development does not help to smooth consumption for the whole nation and inland areas. 
However, many of the estimated coefficients of the interaction terms between capital market 
development indicators  and output growth are statistically significantly negative for coastal 
areas in different sample periods. This suggests that capital market development has played an 
important role in fostering risk sharing in coastal areas.   
Only the coastal provinces have obtained risk-sharing benefits from the development of capital 
markets since their reestablishment in the 1990s. The inland provinces have  largely  been 
denied access to these benefits. Capital market development has not generated significant risk-
sharing benefits nationally. This is largely due to the imbalanced development of capital markets 
across regions. Du and Xu (2008) argue that the quota system in the PRC securities market 
effectively functions as a decentralized regulatory instrument and find that it has tended to favor 
coastal areas as they are home to the majority of listed firms in the PRC. From the perspective 
of individual families, average income per family in the inland provinces is substantially lower 
than in coastal areas. Individual families in inland provinces may not have enough extra income, 
sufficient knowledge about securities, or a local community investment culture to invest in the 
securities markets, which is manifested in the lower ratio of securities trading accounts opened 
by  people  in inland areas. It is therefore  not surprising that residents in inland areas have 
received few benefits from risk sharing through cross-regional asset ownership in the capital 
market development process. 
6.2  Development of Informal Finance and Risk Sharing  
Table 7 presents the estimation results for private investment. In general, informal finance has 
negative effects on risk sharing for all three samples and the three periods under examination. 
Statistically significant effects are detected for  1998–2007,  when  informal finance seems to 
have depressed risk sharing in inland areas to a significant extent. This result is not surprising. 
Allen et al.  (2005) suggest that the most important governance mechanism of nonstandard 
financing is based on reputation and relationships. This argument leads to the supposition that 
implicit contractual relations cause the use of most informal finance modes to be confined to 
local business communities. This  prevents  the  movement of capital across regions and 
depresses risk sharing. As coastal areas have better infrastructure and institutions to support 
the growth of private enterprises  and relationship-based informal  finance,  the interprovincial 
movement of private capital may be more frequent in coastal areas than in inland areas. Hence, 
the repressive effects of informal finance on interprovincial consumption risk sharing are less 
salient in coastal areas than in inland areas. Overall, more private investment takes place in 
coastal areas with stronger supporting institutions than in inland areas; this reinforces regional 
disparities in economic growth and worsens interprovincial risk sharing. ADBI Working Paper 334    Du, He, and Rui 
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Table 7: Risk Sharing, Foreign Direct Investment, and Informal Finance 
  1990–2007  1990–1999  1998–2007 
Item  PI  FDI  PI  FDI  PI  FDI 
All Regions             
Output  0.618***  0.636***  0.565***  0.670***  0.492***  0.426*** 
  (0.115)  (0.072)  (0.117)  (0.072)  (0.165)  (0.120) 
Output*IF  0.39  0.067  0.449  -0.181  1.492  0.349*** 
  (0.651)  (0.149)  (0.696)  (0.127)  (1.129)  (0.118) 
R 0.332 
2  0.366  0.286  0.362  0.361  0.358 
N  522  522  289  290  290  290 
Coastal 
Regions 
           
Output  0.616***  0.621***  522***  0.689***  0.616**  0.700** 
  (0.137)  (0.132)  (0.120)  (0.154)  (0.218)  (0.286) 
Output*IF  0.48  0.048  0.071  -0.229  1.533  0.090 
  (1.033)  (0.177)  (1.087)  (0.141)  (1.748)  (0.217) 
R 0.385 
2  0.414  0.298  0.310  0.6  0.587 
N  198  198  110  110  110  110 
Inland 
Regions 
           
Output  0.641***  0.739***  0.568***  0.806**  0.005  0.092 
  (0.219)  (0.146)  (0.206)  (0.152)  (0.332)  (0.210) 
Output*IF  0.351  -0.920  0.729  -1.977  3.485*  1.526* 
  (1.083)  (0.779)  (1.065)  (1.664)  (1.868)  (0.821) 
R 0.302 
2  0.353  0.311  0.373  0.182  0.265 
N  324  324  180  180  180  180 
 
Note: This table reports the results of panel regressions with yearly observations. Output*IF represents the interaction 
between output and each informal financial channel indicator. FDI is the ratio of foreign direct investment stock to total 
investment and PI is the ratio of private investment to total investment. The inland regions include Anhui, Gansu, Guangxi, 
Guizhou, Heilongjiang, Henan, Hubei, Hunan, Inner Mongolia, Jiangxi, Jilin, Ningxia, Qinghai, Shaanxi, Shanxi, Sichuan, 
Xinjiang, and Yunnan. The coastal regions include Beijing, Fujian, Guangdong, Hainan, Hebei, Jiangsu, Liaoning, 
Shandong, Shanghai, Tianjin, and Zhejiang. The regressions include both province fixed effects and time effects. The 
standard errors robust to heteroscedasticity are reported in brackets. The symbols ***, **, and * indicate statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
Source: Authors. 
6.3  Globalization, Foreign Direct Investment, and Risk Sharing 
Table 7 presents the results reflecting the impact of inward FDI stock on risk sharing. FDI stock 
does not have statistically significant effects on risk sharing across the country as a whole or in 
the two subregions for the whole sample period. Examining the two subperiods, we found that 
FDI stock did not have a significant impact on risk sharing during 1990–1999, although the 
direction of its effect points to  its role in  promoting risk sharing. However, FDI depressed 
interprovincial risk sharing during 1998–2007; this effect is statistically significant across the 
country as a whole and in inland areas. The results are consistent with the Kose et al. (2009 
assessment that FDI does not contribute to consumption risk sharing in emerging markets.  
The failure of FDI to  promote  interprovincial risk sharing is probably a consequence of the 
persistently uneven distribution of FDI across PRC provinces. From the early 1980s to the mid-
1990s, the central government set up a national policy framework to attract FDI and exerted 
substantial influence over which  provinces received  FDI. Based on its national economic 
development plan, the central government channeled the majority of FDI inflow to special 
economic zones and major liberalized cities lying along the east coast. Inland areas received 
only  a small proportion of FDI inflow. In the mid-1990s, the central government largely ADBI Working Paper 334    Du, He, and Rui 
 
 
  28 
liberalized the FDI introduction process by allowing local governments to compete directly for 
FDI inflow (Oman 2000). As a result, the uneven distribution of FDI inflow persisted because 
coastal areas  had  better infrastructure,  superior  institutions, and more  skilled labor to 
accommodate FDI (Du et al. 2009 He et al. 2009. Moreover, Since FDI is an important resource 
for local economic development, local governments did not allow FDI to move across regions, 
reinforcing the uneven interprovincial distribution of FDI. The persistently uneven distribution of 
FDI appears to have added to interprovincial disparities in economic growth, contributed to the 
correlation of output and consumption growth within each province, and reduced the extent of 
risk sharing across regions. 
6.4  Industrialization, Urbanization, and Risk Sharing 
Our earlier results suggest that nonfiscal channels have made a much greater contribution to 
risk sharing in inland areas than in coastal areas. However, our results also demonstrate that 
financial intermediary development played only a slightly more significant role in achieving risk 
sharing in inland areas than it did in coastal areas  in the 1990s, whereas capital market 
development contributed substantially more to risk sharing in coastal areas than in inland areas 
over the same time frame. Hence, some alternative channels must have been at work.  
We next investigated  what else may have affected risk sharing in the interior provinces. 
Presumably, rural–urban migration has contributed substantially to risk sharing. A primary 
indicator of its importance is the rising share of total rural household income represented by 
nonfarming income, particularly after 1990. Figure 3 exhibits the sharply increasing trend after 
1990.  
Figure 3: Share of Nonfarm Income in Total Rural Net Income 
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Given that informal finance and FDI have worsened risk sharing and formal finance has made 
no appreciable contribution to risk sharing in inland provinces in the last decade, the surge in 
nonfarming income suggests that remittances  might  have played an increasing role in risk 
sharing in recent years. ADBI Working Paper 334      Du, He, and Rui 
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Table 8: Risk Sharing and Urbanization 
 
    1990–2007  1990–1999  1998–2007 
Item  Urban1  Urban2  Urban3  Urban4  Urban1  Urban2  Urban3  Urban4  Urban1  Urban2  Urban3  Urban4 
All Regions                         
Output  0.686***  0.629**  0.557***  0.477***  0.638***  0.610*  0.698***  0.443***  0.647***  0.609  0.764***  0.419*** 
  (0.067)  (0.078)  (0.092)  (0.069)  (0.074)  (0.071)  (0.115)  (0.113)  (0.161)  (0.156)  (0.116)  (0.074) 
Output*Urbanization  -0.02  0.043  0.003  -0.041**  -0.026  0.029  0.005  -0.036  0.102  0.129  0.003  -0.047** 
  (0.098)  (0.113)  (0.006)  (0.016)  (0.109)  (0.118)  (0.009)  (0.024)  (0.251)  (0.246)  (0.005)  (0.020) 
R 0.316 
2  0.316  0.378  0.201  0.285  0.285  0.558  0.176  0.322  0.321  0.511  0.175 
N  486  486  78  448  270  270  52  280  270  270  52  278 
Coastal Regions                         
Output  0.611***  0.072  0.537***  0.0616***  0.492***  0.174  1.033***  0.720***  0.885***  858**  1.008***  0.446*** 
  (0.159)  (0.191)  (0.174)  (0.114)  (0.106)  (0.225)  (0.244)  (0.248)  (0.205)  (0.411)  (0.202)  (0.164) 
Output* 
Urbanization 
0.087  0.814**  -0.066  -0.149  0.108  0.573  -0.242**  -0.28  -0.092  -0.056  -0.04  0.071 
  (0.205)  (0.292)  (0.068)  (0.175)  (0.138)  (0.362)  (0.063)  (0.353)  (0.247)  (0.504)  (0.044)  (0.351) 
R 0.386 
2  0.399  0.281  0.263  0.291  0.295  0.602  0.256  0.597  0.596  0.682  0.206 
N  198  198  33  176  110  110  22  110  110  110  22  110 
Inland Regions                         
Output  0.778***  1.347***  0.657***  0.425***  0.781***  1.644***  0.851***  0.276**  0.696***  2.213***  0.625**  0.373** 
  (0.080)  (0.332)  (0.119)  (0.096)  (0.077)  (0.515)  (0.125)  (0.105)  (0.120)  (0.522)  (0.089)  (0.166) 
Output* 
Urbanization 
-0.075  -0.971*  -0.012*  -0.030*  -0.204*  -1.592*  -0.026*  -0.006  -0.005  -2.148***  -0.011***  -0.050* 
  (0.092)  (0.525)  (0.006)  (0.016)  (0.097)  (0.832)  (0.012)  (0.018)  (0.197)  (0.694)  (0.004)  (0.027) 
R 0.356 
2  0.362  0.428  0.229  0.361  0.37  0.654  0.167  0.222  0.236  0.487  0.217 
N  288  288  45  272  160  160  30  170  160  160  30  168 
 
Note: This table reports the results of panel regressions with yearly observations. Output* Urbanization represents the interaction between output and each nonfarm income 
indicator. Urban1 is measured as the percentage of per capita household disposable income over the per capita gross output value of farming, forestry, and husbandry at the 
provincial level. Urban2 is measured as 1 minus the ratio of the gross output value of farming, forestry, and husbandry to GDP. Urban3 is the ratio of migration outflow to 
migration inflow based on provincial migration data from the National Census. Urban4 is the ratio of migration outflow to migration inflow based on the linear interpolation. A 
higher value indicates a larger degree of interprovincial migration. The inland regions include Anhui, Gansu, Guangxi, Guizhou, Heilongjiang, Henan, Hubei, Hunan, Inner 
Mongolia, Jiangxi, Jilin, Ningxia, Qinghai, Shaanxi, Shanxi, Sichuan, Xinjiang, and Yunnan. The coastal regions include Beijing, Fujian, Guangdong, Hainan, Hebei, Jiangsu, 
Liaoning, Shandong, Shanghai, Tianjin, and Zhejiang. The regressions include both province-fixed effects and time effects. The standard errors robust to heteroscedasticity 
are reported in brackets. The symbols ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
Source:  ADBI Working Paper 334    Du, He, and Rui 
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The estimation results are presented in Table 8. The two indicators of nonfarming income are 
the ratio of household disposable income to the gross output value of farming, forestry, and 
husbandry (Urban1) and 1 minus the ratio of the gross output value of farming, forestry, and 
husbandry to GDP (Urban2). A higher value means a higher proportion of nonfarming income. 
For the whole sample period of 1990–2007, neither indicator produces significant effects on 
consumption risk sharing for the whole country. Urban1 has no appreciable impact in coastal or 
inland areas. However, we find that Urban2  enhances risk sharing in inland areas and 
depresses it in coastal areas, where both effects are statistically significant. This result makes 
sense because inland areas have in general lagged coastal areas in the industrialization and 
urbanization process and thus the rise in nonfarming income should have a more significant 
effect on consumption smoothing in the interior provinces.  
Looking at the two subperiods, we found that the stimulant effect of Urban1 on risk sharing in 
inland provinces was statistically significant only in the 1990s. This is probably because this was 
when rural–urban migration exploded after the launch of the second round of economic reforms 
in 1992; it thus had the greatest impact on risk sharing in that decade. We also found that the 
stimulant effect of Urban2  on risk sharing in the inland provinces was significant in both 
subperiods. However, neither indicator had significant effects for the whole country or coastal 
areas. In 2000, the central government began an experimental reform of the residence 
registration system in more than 20,000 small towns. Local governments also started to reform 
their individual Hukou  systems and made urban residency more easily obtainable for rural 
migrant labors. In early 2002, the State Council issued the No. 2 Document of 2002, which 
designated migrant workers as “members of the working class” rather than peasants, thereby 
formally acknowledging their contribution to urban development.
35
In Table 8, we include another indicator, Urban3, which is the ratio of migration outflow to 
migration inflow. A higher value for this indicator suggests a larger number of laborers seeking 
employment outside the province. In comparison  with  Urban1  and  Urban2,  which  may 
incorporate the various effects of industrialization, urbanization,  and rural–urban migration, 
Urban3 is the most direct proxy for the importance of interprovincial rural–urban migration. It 
gauges the relative size of outbound migrant labor flows for different provinces and thus the 
relative importance of the remittances of migrant workers. Owing to data constraints, the sample 
size is substantially reduced.
 Further reform of the Hukou 
system could partially explain the stimulant effect of Urban2 on risk sharing in inland provinces 
observed in the later subperiod.  
36
                                                 
35 In January 2003, the State Council Office’s No. 1 Document set out four principles underlying the 
following commitments: abolish any excessively  unfair restrictions on rural laborers seeking either 
temporary or permanent employment in urban areas; ensure that employers of migrant laborers act in 
accordance with the law concerning contracts and the punctual payment of wages; improve working and 
living conditions for rural migrant laborers, especially women, including health care and personal safety; 
provide legal and skills training for rural migrants (training is strictly voluntary and no unreasonable fees 
should be charged); provide access to education for children of migrant workers equal in quality to that 
afforded the children of urban residents; improve the administration of migrant populations including in 
areas of family planning, education for children, labor employment, heath care, and legal aid. 
  As someone may suspect that 5-year intervals will produce 
different results for the same variables that 1-year intervals found, we interpolated  both 
migration outflow and inflow observations in our sample period. We include Urban4, which is 
measured as the ratio of interpolated migration outflow to the interpolated migration inflow. The 
regression results for Urban3 and Urban4 are consistent with and reinforce those based on 
36 Based on (1995, 2000, 2005) census data and Chan (2008), we collected the migrant flows for 1990–1995, 1995–
2000, and 2000–2005. Because the number of migrants is calculated every 5 years, the corresponding GDP and 
consumption growth rate figures were measured on the basis of 5-year periods that do not overlap. ADBI Working Paper 334    Du, He, and Rui 
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Urban1 and Urban2. Urban3 had no significant effect on risk sharing across the whole country 
in the sample periods. It had a significant stimulant effect on risk sharing in coastal areas only 
during 1990–1999. Nonetheless, Urban3 significantly enhanced risk sharing in inland areas for 
all sample periods.  
Our analysis demonstrates that industrialization, urbanization, and interprovincial rural–urban 
migration have been the locomotives of consumption risk sharing in inland areas. As the PRC’s 
Hukou system prevented rural migrant workers from becoming permanent urban residents, the 
remittances of migrant workers lead to increases in income and become a viable means of 
improving living standards in rural households, especially in inland areas, as well as an effective 
instrument for risk sharing in inland areas.
37
This finding has general implications for developing countries. Although other countries may not 
have  a  rigid household registration system preventing  permanent rural–urban migration, 
remittances have still been found to play an important part in overcoming credit constraints 
(Katz and Stark 1986), financing productive investment and other capital expenditure in rural 
areas (Lucas and Stark 1985), and enhancing rural household consumption (Banerjee 1984). 
These functions certainly contribute directly and indirectly to the smoothing of rural household 
consumption and, in turn, to interprovincial risk sharing given an uneven distribution of cities 
across regions. In this sense, the prominent role played by rural–urban migration in facilitating 
interprovincial risk sharing is expected to be a common feature of developing countries. Hence, 
this study contributes to literature that identifies the importance of rural–urban migration and 
remittances to interprovincial risk sharing.  
  
7.  ADDITION CHECKS OF ROBUSTNESS 
7.1  Measures of Variables 
A major concern of the preceding analysis is the measures of income before and after risk 
sharing. To provide a robustness check, we first estimated the ratio of urban population over 
rural population,
38   and used  this ratio to construct the population weighted average of 
household consumption and income. Retained earnings may also  influence the measure of 
income. As a result, we modified  our measure of provincial  income  (PI)  and  disposable 
provincial income (DPI) by including retained earnings.
39
                                                 
37 Giles and Yoo (2007) found that migration facilitates risk coping and risk management, which lead to lower savings 
and higher consumption.  
 As Brandt and Holtz (2006) suggest 
that spatial differences in prices between urban and  rural regions cross PRC provinces are 
substantial, we deflated all the measure of income by using the spatial deflators developed by 
them. Figures 5 and 6 show that the pattern of total risk sharing through the various channels 
and the extent of risk sharing through the fiscal transfer channel for all of the horizons, based 
our new measures, are similar to those of Figures 1 and 2. Table 4, panel D reports the average 
degree  of risk sharing attained through fiscal and nonfiscal channels and the remaining 
unsmoothed part over the whole sample period based on these new measures. The estimation 
results are similar to those of Table 5, panel A.  
38 As official data are unavailable for several provinces, we replaced  the missing data with  the nonagriculture 
population over the agriculture population. 
39 As official data for retained earnings before 1990 is not available before 1990, we derived the series of data by 
interpolation. ADBI Working Paper 334    Du, He, and Rui 
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7.2  Control Variables 
So far, we had been using equation (3) to investigate the potential channels of risk sharing. 
There may be a concern that other omitted variables could influence the relationship between 
each potential channel indicator and consumption risk sharing. To mitigate this concern, we 
reestimated equation (3) by including various control variables used in Section 4.3, such as the 
logarithm of initial real GDP per capita and the 5-year lagged population growth rate. The 
untabulated results show that these estimations yield qualitatively similar results on the 
relationship between the channel indicator and the extent of consumption risk sharing. 
7.3  Multivariate Analysis 
Another potential concern about the preceding analysis is related to the univariate regression 
models we used to assess the separate role of each channel in fostering risk sharing. To see 
whether our approach causes serious bias, we adopted a multivariate regression model to 
assess all potential risk-sharing channels simultaneously. We chose the ratio of total loans to 
GDP, the ratio of total equity to GDP, the ratio of FDI stock to GDP, the ratio of private 
investment  to total investment, and Urban2  (1 minus the ratio of the gross output value of 
farming, forestry, and husbandry to GDP) to represent the roles of the credit market, the capital 
market, globalization, informal finance, and urbanization, respectively.
40
                                                 
40 We also used  alternative measures for  each risk-sharing channel. Our results are robust across a variety  of 
specifications.  
 Table 9 presents the 
estimation results  for  all these  measures of consumption risk sharing. The results are 
qualitatively equivalent to those we obtained earlier by conducting univariate regression analysis 
for each channel separately, which reinforces the robustness of our conclusions. We also 
compared the different roles played by the domestic channels (formal finance, informal finance, 
and urbanization) and international channel (globalization) on the interprovincial consumption 
risk sharing. We found that the effect of domestic channels dominate that of international 
channel. This implies that financial globalization is not conducive to risk sharing because foreign 
portfolio flows into the PRC are rather limited in size because the PRC’s capital account has not 
been liberalized  and  the  persistently uneven distribution of FDI increases  the correlation of 
output and consumption growth within each province. ADBI Working Paper 334    Du, He, and Rui 
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Table 9: Multivariate Analysis 
 




































Output  0.324  -0.039  1.920**
* 
0.879  0.207  2.942**
* 
-0.337  0.454  1.653 
  (0.380)  (0.396)  (0.564)  (0.694)  (1.177)  (0.658)  (0.603)  (0.545)  (1.115) 
Output*Credit  0.01  0.017  -0.067  -0.179  0.283  -0.43  0.28  -0.347  0.319 
  (0.200)  (0.329)  (0.180)  (0.407)  (0.546)  (0.271)  (0.298)  (0.244)  (0.462) 
Output*Capit
al 
-3.667  -3.883*  2.095  -1.339  0.598  -1.655  -1.198  -3.779*  4.798 










0.04  0.047  -0.093  -0.083  -0.102  -0.549  0.073**
* 
0.071  0.141 
  (0.031)  (0.032)  (0.167)  (0.075)  (0.067)  (0.385)  (0.023)  (0.063)  (0.253) 
Output*FDI  -0.203  0.481  -1.32  -0.169  0.333  -1.980*  3.315*  -0.046  4.034 





-1.380*  0.022  0.203  -
2.318** 
0.174  0.751  -
2.382** 
  (0.427)  (0.243)  (0.752)  (0.599)  (0.664)  (0.855)  (0.380)  (0.571)  (0.870) 
R 0.315 
2  0.41  0.356  0.293  0.305  0.377  0.355  0.592  0.239 
N  492  198  305  290  110  170  289  110  169 
 
Note: This table reports the results of panel regressions based on yearly observations. Output*Credit represents the 
interaction between output and a credit market indicator, the ratio of total loans to GDP. Output*Capital represents the 
interaction between output and a capital market indicator, the ratio of total equity to GDP. Output*IF represents the 
interaction between output and an informal financial market indicator, the ratio of private investment to total investment. 
Output*FDI represents the interaction between output and a globalization indicator, the ratio of FDI stock to GDP. 
Output*Urban2 represents the interaction between output and urbanization indicator, 1 minus the ratio of the gross output 
value of farming, forestry, and husbandry to GDP. The inland regions include Anhui, Gansu, Guangxi, Guizhou, 
Heilongjiang, Henan, Hubei, Hunan, Inner Mongolia, Jiangxi, Jilin, Ningxia, Qinghai, Shaanxi, Shanxi, Sichuan, Xinjiang, 
and Yunnan. The coastal regions include Beijing, Fujian, Guangdong, Hainan, Hebei, Jiangsu, Liaoning, Shandong, 
Shanghai, Tianjin, and Zhejiang. The regressions include both province-fixed effects and time effects. The standard errors 
robust to heteroscedasticity are reported in brackets. The symbols ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 
5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
Source: Authors. 
8.  CONCLUSION 
In this study, we examined the patterns of interprovincial risk sharing through various fiscal and 
nonfiscal channels in the PRC  by employing a variety of empirical approaches. First, we 
examined the evolution of overall risk sharing achieved by the country as a whole and by the 
coastal and inland areas in different periods. The results suggest that during 1980–2007, not 
even 40% of consumption risks were insured, which is fairly low. The extent of risk sharing 
achieved through the fiscal channel rose (nonfiscal channels  dropped)  during 1990–2007 
compared with that realized  during 1980–1997.  In terms of regional patterns,  no significant 
difference in the extent of risk sharing was found between inland and coastal areas. However, 
the two areas display marked  differences in the channels through which risk sharing is 
achieved. The fiscal transfer channel plays a much more important part in coastal areas than in ADBI Working Paper 334    Du, He, and Rui 
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inland areas, whereas the nonfiscal channels have contributed much more to risk sharing in 
inland areas than in coastal areas.  
Second, we explored in detail the various components of the nonfiscal channels by directly 
measuring the impacts of the development of financial intermediaries, capital markets, informal 
finance, FDI, and rural–urban migration on the extent of risk sharing across PRC provinces. We 
found that the development of a formal financial system plays a modest role in promoting risk 
sharing. Although the private financing channel plays an important part  in driving regional 
economic growth, it depresses interprovincial  risk sharing because of its local financing 
orientation.  
Given the limited and declining role of financial intermediary development  in achieving risk 
sharing in the inland regions, the high degree of risk sharing achieved by the PRC’s inland 
provinces is mainly attributable to the surge in nonfarming income. We examined the pattern of 
the share of total rural net income represented by nonfarming income during 1980–2007 and 
investigated  whether remittances by migrant labor improved interprovincial  risk sharing. We 
found that nonfarming income as a share of total rural net income surged in the 1990s and 
coincided with an improvement in risk sharing in the same decade. The results of our panel 
regressions also suggest that the increasing role of remittances has partially alleviated the 
depressive impact of financial markets on risk sharing. Our findings imply that low consumption 
risk sharing could be one explanation for the high savings rate in the PRC, and that urbanization 
and industrialization could enhance interprovincial risk sharing in regions with less-developed 
financial markets.  ADBI Working Paper 334    Du, He, and Rui 
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